- AutorIn
- Felix Roesel
- Titel
- The Political Economy of Fiscal Supervision and Budget Deficits: Evidence from Germany
- Zitierfähige Url:
- https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:bsz:14-qucosa-217869
- Schriftenreihe
- CEPIE Working Paper
- Bandnummer
- 02/17
- Abstract (EN)
- In many federal countries, local governments run large deficits, even when fiscal supervision by state authorities is tight. I investigate to which extent party alignment of governments and fiscal supervisors influences budget deficits. The dataset includes 427 German local governments for the period 2000–2004. I exploit a period after a far-reaching institutional reform that entirely re-distributed political powers on both the government level and the fiscal supervisor level. Results do not show that party alignments of governments and supervisors (co-partisanship) drive short-term deficits. Instead, I find that the ideology of partisan governments and supervisors matters: left-wing local governments run higher deficits than their right-wing counterparts; left-wing supervisors tolerate higher deficits than right-wing supervisors. These findings imply that political independence for fiscal supervisors is recommended.
- Freie Schlagwörter (DE)
- Öffentliche Finanzen, Parteien, Kommunen
- Freie Schlagwörter (EN)
- Local government; Budget deficits; Fiscal supervision; Partisan cycle
- Klassifikation (DDC)
- 330
- Klassifikation (RVK)
- QC 000
- Normschlagwörter (GND)
- Volkswirtschaftslehre
- Publizierende Institution
- Technische Universität Dresden, Dresden
- URN Qucosa
- urn:nbn:de:bsz:14-qucosa-217869
- Veröffentlichungsdatum Qucosa
- 23.01.2017
- Dokumenttyp
- Forschungsbericht
- Sprache des Dokumentes
- Englisch
- Lizenz / Rechtehinweis