**Dieses Dokument ist eine Zweitveröffentlichung (Verlagsversion) /
This is a self-archiving document (published version):**

Laura Carsten Mahrenbach

Deconstructing 'Emerging Powers' and 'Emerging Markets': India and the United States in Global Governance

Erstveröffentlichung in / First published in:

India Quarterly. 2015, 71(4), S. 348 - 364 [Zugriff am: 14.08.2019]. SAGE journals. ISSN 0975-2684.

DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1177/0974928415602601>

Diese Version ist verfügbar / This version is available on:

<https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:bsz:14-qucosa2-355539>

„Dieser Beitrag ist mit Zustimmung des Rechteinhabers aufgrund einer (DFGgeförderten) Allianz- bzw. Nationallizenz frei zugänglich.“

This publication is openly accessible with the permission of the copyright owner. The permission is granted within a nationwide license, supported by the German Research Foundation (abbr. in German DFG).

www.nationallizenzen.de/

Deconstructing ‘Emerging Powers’ and ‘Emerging Markets’: India and the United States in Global Governance

India Quarterly
71(4) 348–364
© 2015 Indian Council
of World Affairs (ICWA)
SAGE Publications
sagepub.in/home.nav
DOI: 10.1177/0974928415602601
<http://iqq.sagepub.com>

Laura Carsten Mahrenbach¹

Abstract

Academic literature and the media offer a variety of monikers for emerging states like Brazil, India and China, most prominently, ‘emerging powers’ and ‘emerging markets’. This article argues the terms used to describe these states create assumptions about their behaviour in global governance (GG). In order to accurately assess the impact of emerging states on international institutions, it is necessary to more systematically examine their current participation in GG. Does the use of power and economic interests in GG negotiations distinguish emerging states from traditional powers, as the ‘emerging’ part of these terms suggests? And can the content of GG negotiations predict the dominance of each factor, as implied by the ‘power/market’ part? This article tackles these questions by comparing the behaviour of one emerging state (India) and one traditional power (the United States) in negotiations at the World Trade Organisation and the United Nations Security Council. The results demonstrate that, while there is clearly something distinctive about at least India’s participation in GG, focussing on power or economic interests alone is insufficient to explain that distinctiveness or its implications for relations between rising and traditional powers in GG.

Keywords

Emerging powers, emerging markets, United Nations Security Council, World Trade Organisation (WTO), United States, India

Introduction

Academic literature and the media offer a variety of monikers for emerging states like Brazil, India and China, most prominently, ‘emerging powers’ and ‘emerging markets’. While the first half of these terms—emerging—implies ambition and motion, the second half suggests the focus of that motion—more power, a larger market (and maybe both). This paper argues the terms used to describe emerging states create assumptions about their behaviour in global governance (GG).

¹ Post-doctoral Fellow, Technical University of Dresden, Dresden, Germany

Corresponding author:

Laura Carsten Mahrenbach, Technical University of Dresden, Dresden, Germany.
E-mail: laura.mahrenbach@tu-dresden.de

Emerging states are said to have two choices vis-à-vis existing GG institutions: either they will commit to existing institutions to maximise their own benefits or they will aim to shape institutions in line with their own preferences (Kahler, 2013). The latter option, reflecting the power-based focus implicit in ‘emerging powers’, predicts future conflict between emerging states and traditional powers; emerging states are unlikely to accept status quo institutional settings within GG and may even adopt the role of ‘spoilers’ within these institutions (Stephen, 2012). As a result, increased activism of emerging states in GG should correspond to less effective multilateral decision-making (Gilboy & Heginbotham, 2013) and to a general disruption to the existing GG order (Lesage & Van de Graaf, 2015). In contrast, the former option, reflecting the market orientation of ‘emerging markets’, sees both emerging state and traditional power interests as crucially tied to GG institutions; emerging states seek ‘evolution, not revolution’ (Armijo & Roberts, 2014). Consequently, they should continue to cooperate with traditional powers within GG as long as these institutions continue to provide the economic benefits emerging states—and powerful domestic actors—seek (Foot, 2006; Vigevani & Cepaluni, 2007).

As is evident, the tacit assumptions in the terms used to describe emerging states have focussed research and media coverage in a way which, to date, has failed to generate clear, policy-relevant understandings of emerging state behaviour in the multilateral order. Additionally, contemporary expectations regarding emerging state–traditional power interaction within GG are more contradictory than coherent. Circumstances, thus, require new conceptual understandings not only to explain emerging state behaviour (Mansfield, 2014), but also to better delineate their relationships with traditional powers and to provide nuances regarding the implications of their ‘emergence’ for the future of GG. This paper combines conceptual and empirical analysis to systematically deconstruct the terms ‘emerging powers’ and ‘emerging markets’ as a first step in this direction.

The analysis proceeds in two parts. First, the ‘emerging’ part of emerging state monikers implies that, while resembling both developing countries and traditional powers, emerging states should also demonstrate something unique in their GG behaviour which distinguishes them from both groups. Given the lack of explicit, contemporaneous empirical comparisons between the behaviour of emerging states and traditional powers in GG, this article focusses on the latter half of this transition. To what extent does the use of power and economic interests by emerging states in GG negotiations distinguish them from traditional powers? Second, the ‘power/market’ half of these terms makes clear that both power-based and market-based goals are important to emerging states and, what is more, interact with one another in numerous ways.¹ Consequently, it seems necessary to understand when each goal is likely to be prioritised by emerging state governments. While there is ample theoretical and anecdotal exploration of this in the literature (Drezner, 2007; Ikenberry, 2008; Kahler, 2013), studies empirically analysing the actual participation of emerging states in GG within this context are rare. Can the content of GG negotiations predict when emerging states will prioritise power over economic interests—and vice versa—in their GG participation?

These questions are addressed by examining the behaviour of one emerging state, India, and one traditional power, the United States, in recent negotiations at the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and the United Nations Security Council (UNSC).² Previewing the results, while the evidence supports the connection between the content of GG negotiations and the importance of economic interests for emerging states, this connection is not apparent related to power. Furthermore, the results show two distinct differences between emerging states and traditional powers. First, the US government was more likely to de-emphasise power and the Indian government to emphasise it. Second, the corpora of Indian and US government statements were much more similar in economic negotiations than in security negotiations.

The article proceeds as follows. The next two sections present the power-based and market-based approaches to emerging states, deriving hypotheses from each and presenting the operationalisation used to assess the hypotheses in the case studies. This is followed by case studies analysing Indian and US participation in WTO and UNSC negotiations. Finally, the conclusion briefly discusses the academic and practical implications of the paper's findings.

Competing Perspectives: Power-based Versus Market-based Explanations

This article employs inductive and deductive analysis to operationalise the power-based and market-based approaches implicit in the terms 'emerging powers' and 'emerging markets'. The deductive portion of the paper addresses the 'power/market' half of these appellations. At their core, the power-based and market-based perspectives on emerging states represent contradictory conceptual understandings of these states' behaviour. Drawing on the neorealist concept of the challenger state, power-based explanations treat emerging states as unitary actors which attempt to maximise their relative power position and capabilities vis-à-vis traditional great powers (Drezner, 2007; Ikenberry, 2008). Doing so should increase emerging states' security—states' primary concern—and simultaneously help emerging states improve their relative power position in the world system (Waltz, 1979). Unlike challenger states, however, emerging states viewed from a power-based perspective recognise the value of international institutions in advancing these goals. For example, Pardesi (2007) describes efforts to gain more influence within GG institutions, for example, by attaining a permanent seat on the UNSC, as one of the Indian government's major policy goals. Others see India's participation within these organisations as facilitating increased Indian influence via development of issue-based alliances with key partners, as in India's coalition activities at the WTO (Gratius, 2008; Narlikar, 2006). Thus, this perspective sees the increased activism of emerging states in GG as advancing power-based priorities, including preserving autonomy of action or constraining traditional powers' influence (Hurrell, 2006). Since security is considered policymakers' top priority in power-based explanations and since increasing relative power is thought to make emerging states more secure, officials should prioritise power considerations over all other considerations when security issues are at stake. Hypothesis 1 (H1) consequently claims, *when GG negotiations focus on security issues, components of power will dominate economic interests in emerging state rhetoric*.

Market-based explanations, in contrast, focus on the national rather than the international level. Emerging state politicians are said to respond to the preferences of domestic interest groups, which compete with one another to exert their influence on policymaking through lobbying (Moravcsik, 1997). Interest groups intensify lobbying efforts when proposed policies directly impact their economic interests (Schirm, 2009). Thus, emerging state governments see participation in GG as a means of ensuring strong economic performance and safeguarding the economic well-being of the most powerful domestic actors (Hirst, 2008).³ Along these lines, Kale argues that the Indian government and the Confederation of Indian Industry have established a 'tight alliance' in their mutual efforts to attract investment and promote trade (2009, p. 59). Likewise, Schaffer notes that in some issue areas, including trade and non-proliferation, India's 'domestic policy rather than its multilateral diplomacy' dominates the positions taken by the Indian government in GG (2010, p. 222). Since intensified domestic engagement is expected when policies directly affect interest groups, emerging state governments should prioritise influential

groups' economic interests over power concerns when GG negotiations address economic issues. Hypothesis 2 (H2) consequently claims, *when GG negotiations focus on distributive questions, economic interests will dominate components of power in emerging state rhetoric*.⁴

These hypotheses operationalise each understanding by connecting it with a single variable. If power-based arguments are correct, emerging states should prioritise the components of power in GG rhetoric. Acknowledging the diverse definitions of power in the literature (see Barnett & Duvall, 2005), this article adopts a broad definition (Baldwin, 1979), arguing power encompasses a number of components—including a state's economic wealth—which affect hierarchical, decision-making responsibility and processes between actors. This study singles out three components. The first, autonomy, is defined as a state's ability to pursue its goals despite limitations imposed upon it by external constraints, including participation in governance regimes and agreements. The second, influence, is a state's ability to ensure outcomes within GG institutions reflect its preferences. This refers both to a state's formal decision-making power within an institution as well as to its ability to affect the behaviour of other states within the institution. Finally, the third, sovereignty, is defined as states' freedom from external intervention in their domestic affairs, for example, via intrusive GG policies.⁵

In contrast, if market-based arguments are correct, emerging states should feature economic interests in GG rhetoric. Economic interests are economic actions which, when implemented, generate economic costs and benefits for private actors as a result of government decisions (Mahrenbach, 2013). Three components appear relevant given the scope of the UNSC and the WTO. The first, liberalisation, refers to gaining access to new markets or expanding access to existing markets. The second, protection, is defined as maintaining or decreasing given levels of market access. Finally, the third, sectoral interests, comprises the costs and benefits expected by individual sectors—for example, fishermen, the chemical industry or small- and medium-sized enterprises—resulting from GG decisions.

In real-world politics, of course, economic interests and power are often closely interlinked. *The Economist*, for example, recently noted Indian investments in regional economic infrastructure, which promote trade and economic growth within India and in the South Asian region, are intended to, in the Foreign Secretary's words, get India's 'neighbourhood' to 'root' for it in attempting to become a 'leading power' in the world (*The Economist*, 2015a). Similarly, emerging states may see increased influence at the WTO as a key step in improving domestic actors' economic situation. Nonetheless, while acknowledging that money contributes to power and vice versa, this article will maintain the separation between these variables in line with previous studies (Huotari & Hanemann, 2014) to maximise analytical simplicity and, thereby, clarify the findings.

Turning to the 'emerging' half of the analysis, a deductive process seems less fruitful as only one approach can predict a definite relationship between emerging states and traditional powers. From a market-based perspective, governments should always prioritise domestic actors' economic interests in GG negotiations, regardless of issue area. Consequently, the differences between emerging states and traditional powers—if any—should confine themselves to which interests each government chooses to favour based upon differing domestic interest constellations. In contrast, while power-based approaches would predict emerging states will highlight power in both types of negotiations to signal their intentions and intimidate traditional powers, it is unclear what traditional powers should do. Should they, like emerging states, emphasise power to underline their continued dominance over emerging states and thereby risk conflict? Or should they de-emphasise power in an attempt to appease emerging states and stabilise the status quo balance of power? Thus, this part of the analysis employs an inductive approach to generate some initial similarities and differences between emerging states and traditional powers in GG.

Operationalisation

The case studies trace the presence of economic interests and the components of power in Indian government commentary during two sets of GG negotiations: the WTO mini-ministerial negotiations in Geneva in 2008 and the discussions concerning Libya in the UNSC in 2011. These institutional settings were chosen to maximise variation on the independent variables: while the WTO negotiations are primarily concerned with distributive questions related to potential trade liberalisation commitments, the UNSC negotiations focussed on the security implications of the deteriorating situation in Libya.

Why India and the United States? Power-based explanations point to factors such as economic and military strength or population growth as useful criteria for identifying rising powers. Although India's population may be as much a burden as a benefit (*The Economist*, 2015b), from a power perspective, India's burgeoning population, nuclear power status and booming economy—now growing faster than China's—all qualify it as an emerging state. Likewise, as a functioning democracy with an increasingly active and effective civil society (Yadav, 2008), it is also a country whose policy behaviour can plausibly be examined using market-based assumptions. As the only emerging state fulfilling both of these criteria, India seems an ideal test case for H1 and H2. Similarly, the United States was chosen to represent the quintessential traditional power, and provides an especially strong contrast to India. Not only does the United States possess the permanent UNSC membership, which India has unsuccessfully sought for years, but its history of exclusive, bilateral decision-making with European states at the WTO has contributed to Indian activism during the Doha Round. Consequently, the factors evident in US policymaking in both cases are most likely to differ from those of India if, in fact, there is something unique about what motivates emerging state behaviour in GG.

For both countries, the analysis considers only statements that can be attributed to elected or appointed government officials. These include the heads of state, the secretaries and ministers from the foreign affairs, defence and economic ministries, as well as the WTO and the UN representatives. Government statements were collected from government websites as well as from major periodicals accessed through the LexisNexis database. Each corpus of statements was then analysed for the presence of the components of power and economic interests. In addition, they were analysed for relevant contextual variables. For the WTO case, these included statements referencing the negotiations themselves and statements addressing development, that is, special consideration for developing countries and their concerns as per the Doha mandate. The UNSC case controls are more diverse, including not only comments on the negotiations but also statements referencing human rights violations and/or a need to protect human rights; statements referencing the appropriateness (or not) of a military solution; and statements calling for the establishment or strengthening of democratic political institutions or processes. These contextual variables will not be addressed explicitly due to space limitations. However, their appearance in the results figures underlines that power and economic interests should impact emerging state government decisions *within the context* of GG negotiations and thus are measured only relative to one another.

WTO Mini-ministerial Meeting, July 2008

The Doha Round of trade negotiations, underway since 2001, have been marked by confrontation between so-called Northern and Southern states, with the primary fight centred on Southern states' refusal to open non-agricultural markets and Northern states' refusal to open agricultural markets.

Emerging states have been at the centre of this fight, with Brazil and India playing a particularly prominent role since the Cancún ministerial in 2003.

The Geneva mini-ministerial brought together ministers on 21 July 2008 for meetings intended to start resolving remaining issues and to outline the next steps for the Round. Issues included agreeing upon modalities for agricultural and non-agricultural market access (NAMA), and concluding discussion of services and rules. On 23 July, the meetings moved from the Green Room and the Trade Negotiations Committee to an even smaller group: the G7, including the United States and India, which represented 'the core group of seven leading members from the developed and developing world' (Doha Round Talks Sways, Shows Signs of Breakdown, 2008). Negotiations were in trouble soon thereafter as the G7, specifically India, failed to accept the compromise text drafted by the Director General and the negotiation chairs (Blustein, 2009, p. 267). Ultimately, the negotiations failed as the United States, India and China failed to agree on the appropriate trigger level for a special safeguard mechanism which would protect developing country farmers from agricultural import surges (Lilja, 2012). Given the negotiations' focus on distributive questions, this is a case in which to test H2.

India

The distribution of the variables in the Indian corpus provides compelling evidence for H2. Economic interests were roughly seven times more prevalent in the 159 government statements than the components of power. They were even more prevalent than the context variables.⁶ This demonstrates a clear correlation between the distributive character of the policies at stake and the Indian government's prioritisation of economic interests over power considerations.

Turning to the statements' content, economic interest statements were divided roughly evenly between those featuring liberalisation, protection and sectoral interests. Liberalisation statements emphasised the negative impact of trade barriers within the national and international contexts, especially related to agriculture and especially referencing developing countries, including India. Commerce Minister Kamal Nath argued, 'Trade distorting subsidies in agriculture have to be reduced much faster than proposed currently' (DoC, 2008b), and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh noted developed countries 'must dismantle barriers and distortions' (MEA, 2008). In addition, liberalisation statements focussed on the need for a more open trading system. As Prime Minister Singh stated, 'The world economic outlook lends urgency to the establishment of a just, open, reasonable and non-discriminatory international trade system' (MEA, 2008).

Protectionist statements, in contrast, focussed on a need for flexibilities for developing countries in responding to changing trade conditions. For example, Minister Nath underlined India's 'right to safeguard livelihood concerns of hundreds of millions', asking, 'Are we expected to standby, see a surge in imports and do nothing?' (DoC, 2008c). Similarly, he called for 'adequate and appropriate' flexibilities to address 'the sensitivities of individual Members' (DoC, 2008d).

Finally, sectoral interest statements focussed on the potential costs of a Doha deal, especially for the agriculture and automobiles sectors. Commenting on the special safeguard mechanism proposal, Nath stated, 'By the time imports surged by 40 per cent, small farmers would begin to commit suicide. This was unacceptable to us' (WTO Chief Lamy Visiting India to Try to Revive Trade Talks, 2008). Similarly, he argued against concessions which would 'compromise India's industries' (Singh, 2008) or 'disciplines which threaten [fishermen's] livelihoods' (DoC, 2008e). The references to the (severe!) costs expected by individual domestic sectors resulting from the negotiations highlights the relevance of domestic actors for Indian officials. Further, the focus on costs reaffirms the calls for flexibilities and

infant industry protection evident in protectionist statements, suggesting protectionist groups exerted more influence on Indian government positions than did liberalisation supporters in this case.

Government statements featuring the components of power, in contrast, were rare. Influence statements were the most prominent. These highlighted the North–South divide in the negotiations and insisted India's preferences should be included within any final Doha agreement. For example, Minister Nath complained the NAMA draft text 'reflected the views and ambition of only one set of developed countries, while almost completely disregarding the views of more than a hundred developing countries' (DoC, 2008a). Similarly, he highlighted the influence India had over the Doha outcome, stating 'there can be no agreement unless India agrees' (Waltz, 2008). The two autonomy statements underlined the high value attributed to freedom of action by the Indian government. As Nath said, 'India would not accept any constraints or restrictions on its ability to provide assistance to its poor fishermen,' even if this meant the failure of the Round (DoC, 2008b).

Finally, the single statement featuring sovereignty strictly forbids external involvement in India's domestic economic affairs. Nath noted India's increased involvement in the world economy 'doesn't mean, however, that India is willing to cede control over its most sensitive sectors, including automobiles, auto components, textiles, and agriculture' (Kinetz, 2008). The reference to India's 'most sensitive sectors' indicates that, even in statements where the government underlined power as a motivating factor, the premises central to market-based, societal explanations were nonetheless relevant to Indian government actors. Specifically, although this statement aligns with neorealist assumptions about sovereignty as a means of preventing harm to state resources and, thus, its relative power position, the use of 'sensitive' suggests a political dimension within the Indian state which the government considered relevant in these negotiations.

The United States

Turning to the United States, if there is something unique about emerging state participation in GG, the US government should employ economic interests and the components of power differently in its 166 statements than the Indian government did in its own. However, the overall distribution shows significant similarities. Economic interests dominated both governments' commentary, and each country emphasised power to a similar degree. Further, both countries emphasised influence more than the other components of power and all three economic interests were present in both corpora. In fact, the only major difference related to which economic interest each government emphasised: whereas Indian statements were divided evenly between the three types, US statements tilted heavily towards liberalisation.

Turning to content, liberalisation statements were quite similar in both countries, though the emphasis was different. Like Indian liberalisation statements, some US liberalisation statements maligned protectionist policies with President Bush, for example, noting, 'It's really important to defeat the voices of protectionism now' (Bush, 2008b). The majority of US liberalisation statements, however, focussed not on a simple need for liberalisation but, rather, extolled the national and international benefits of free(r) trade. President Bush stated 'I'm a free trader' and claimed it would be 'disastrous for the world economy and disastrous for poor nations if we didn't trade freely and fairly' (Bush, 2008a). Similarly, US Trade Representative (USTR) Susan Schwab pointed out explicit benefits deriving from free trade, including the 'hundreds of billions of dollars' which China earns through trade (Schwab, 2008b) and the '40 per cent of our nation's total economic growth' which derives from exports (Schwab, 2008a).

Logically, protectionist statements were rare. Like their Indian counterparts, US protectionist statements mostly focussed on a need for flexibilities. Schwab, for example, acknowledged a need for protectionist measures to ‘address legitimate needs when it comes to surges that are damaging to the livelihoods of subsistence farmers’ (Schwab, 2008c). Unlike Indian statements, however, US statements underline such measures are only appropriate in ‘exceptional situations’ and that their use should be ‘narrowly defined’ (Schwab, 2008c).

The biggest difference between Indian and US economic interest statements appeared in the content of sectoral interest statements. Whereas Indian statements primarily focussed on the costs of a Doha deal, US statements, while acknowledging potential costs, overwhelmingly focussed on the benefits. Schwab claimed the US sought ‘results that will generate new opportunities for our respective exporters, large and small’ (Schwab, 2008e), and Bush wanted to ‘tear down regulatory barriers that hurt our businesses and consumers’ (Bush, 2008c). Also unlike India, the United States additionally underlined the importance of consulting with domestic actors in developing the United States’s negotiating position with Schwab, for example, noting the United States was ‘working closely’ with the agriculture sector (Schwab, 2008b). This focus on benefits and domestic consultation combined with the US’s strong emphasis on liberalisation suggests pro-liberalisation groups, at least, were present on US officials’ radar during the negotiations. Thus, although each government favoured different domestic actors, US economic interest statements underline the relevance of domestic groups for US government actors and, therefore, a similar, market-based logic to the Indian case.

Turning to the components of power, as in India, these statements were rare in the US corpus. US statements featured only one power component, influence, echoing the emphasis Indian government statements placed on influence. Here again, the content is similar between the two countries. Like India, the United States underlined the importance of its own influence for achieving a Doha deal: ‘The United States has been and remains committed to playing a leadership role in achieving a successful movement forward’ (Schwab, 2008c). Unlike India, however, the United States was equally likely to underline the need for *others*—especially emerging states—to assume more responsibility for the outcome of the Round.⁷ This tension in the US relationship—both emphasising and de-emphasising power—is encapsulated in a statement from USTR Schwab: ‘We have signalled our willingness as the United States to play the leadership role that we know we need to, and we look forward to China and other key developed and developing countries doing the same’ (Schwab, 2008d).

Results

Regarding the ‘power/market’ half of the analysis, the evidence confirmed H2: economic interests dominated components of power in Indian statements at the WTO. Additionally, the evidence supported the market-based reasoning behind H2. Government actors showed awareness of the diversity of the Indian economy and acknowledged their accountability to domestic groups in both economic interest statements and, surprisingly, some statements featuring the components of power. Interestingly, this was also true for the US: both countries seemed to be pursuing the interests of domestic actors. In fact, regarding the ‘emerging’ half of the analysis, the comparison discovered only two empirical differences: 1) US policymakers favoured liberal groups while Indian policymakers favoured protectionist groups, and 2) the US negotiation strategy, in contrast to India, explicitly de-emphasised power. The results are summarised in Figure 1.

Figure 1. WTO Results

Source: Author's own.

UNSC Negotiations over Libya, February–March 2011

Anti-government protests began on 16 February 2011 in Benghazi with violent clashes between protesters on one hand and police and government supporters on the other. Over the next week, as protests spread across Libya and multiple Libyan officials resigned their posts, Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi incited his supporters to further violence (Libya Protests: Defiant Gaddafi Refuses to Quit, 2011). By 22 February, both UN officials and the UNSC had called for an end to the violence, with the UNSC demanding 'steps to address the legitimate demands of the population' as well as demonstrations of respect for human rights (UN, 2011b). After intense discussions, the UNSC passed Resolution 1970, imposing sanctions on Libyan authorities. Measures included an arms embargo, a travel ban and asset freeze for members of Gaddafi's administration and select relatives, as well as a referral to the International Criminal Court (ICC) (UNSC, 2011a). India, along with the US, China and Russia, only agreed for adoption once the resolution text made clear that the UNSC, of which these states are members, retained control over determining the necessity of an investigation by the ICC, of which these states are not (Sharma, 2011).

The UN intensified its humanitarian efforts over the next few weeks as fighting continued. On 11 March, the UN sent a Special Envoy to 'undertake broad consultations with Libyan authorities on the immediate humanitarian, political and security situation' and convey the international community's dismay at the events in Libya (UN, 2011a). A few days later, the Arab League requested the UNSC impose a no-fly zone. Debate in the UNSC was heated. India was concerned about the effectiveness and extent of military intervention in Libya and about a lack of information regarding the situation on the ground. The Indian government consequently suggested the UNSC postpone any decision until they had received the report from the Special Envoy lest 'negative outcomes' result from intervention

(MEA, 2011). The United States, in contrast, highlighted the violence against Libyan citizens, diverse requests for intervention, as well as the threat to democratic values posed by the current situation in Libya—all of which, the US claimed, demanded outside intervention (Obama, 2011b). Ultimately, the UNSC passed Resolution 1973 with five abstentions, including India's. Resolution 1973 imposed a no-fly zone, authorised 'all necessary measures' to protect civilians, reaffirmed the arms embargo introduced in Resolution 1970, and strengthened the resolution's financial elements (UNSC, 2011b). Given the security focus of these negotiations, this is a case in which to test H1.

India

The majority of Indian government's 64 statements referenced context variables, namely, Indian government opposition to a military solution and support for protecting human rights. Although the components of power were slightly more prevalent within the corpus than economic interests, neither variable dominated the other. Consequently, based on the distribution of variables, H1 finds little support. What about H1's conceptual basis?

Two components of power—*influence* and *sovereignty*—were featured in Indian government statements. Influence statements emphasised the importance of considering a variety of countries' views, including but not limited to India's, when making decisions at the UN and UNSC. For example, External Affairs Minister S.M. Krishna noted India's UNSC membership 'provides us an opportunity to contribute to the decision making affecting peace and security [...] including Libya' (Krishna, 2011). Similarly, UN Representative Hardeep Puri explained India's abstention vis-à-vis Resolution 1973, saying, 'Passing a resolution is an interactive process ... if countries have doubts ... you try to remove them' (India, Four Others Abstain from UN's Libya No-Fly Zone Resolution, 2011). Statements featuring sovereignty emphasised the importance of allowing Libyan citizens to resolve the crisis themselves and consequently argued against external intervention. Puri called for 'full respect for sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of Libya' (MEA, 2011), while Finance Minister Pranab Mukherjee noted 'no external powers should interfere in it [Libya]' (India Opposes Coalition Strikes in Libya, 2011).

These statements clearly align with the power-based reasoning behind H1. For example, the sovereignty statements emphasise the notion of states as unitary actors (territorial integrity) as well as the importance of allowing each state full control over what happens within its borders as a means to increase stability in the region and, therefore, security. Further, the Indian government's decision to vote for Resolution 1970 once its concerns about the ICC had been addressed underlines the point made in influence statements that the Indian government saw its national goals best protected by ensuring no decisions were made outside its purview. Thus, although the relative presence of the variables failed to validate H1, the evidence does affirm the relevance of H1's foundations for Indian policymaking.

Economic interest statements were divided between statements featuring liberalisation and those featuring sectoral interests. Liberalisation statements emphasised the importance of bilateral trade between India and Libya, especially in relation to oil and fertilisers, and suggested trade relations may be hindered through UN intervention in Libya. For example, Minister Krishna noted, 'over two-thirds of our oil imports' come from the region and that India wanted to 'secur[e] our interests in the widest sense of the word' (Krishna, 2011). Statements featuring sectoral interests highlighted a desire for maintaining and expanding normal economic relationships within Libya and the broader Middle East, as well as fears that UN intervention may negatively affect Indian assets. Discussing the impact of the events in Libya on India's oil supplies, for example, Minister Mukherjee stated, 'It's not just the price issue, but also the availability. I hope normalcy will be restored soon' (Bagchi, 2011). Another statement referenced the impact on the 'vital' trade in 'fertiliser inputs' coming from the region (Q.822 Recent uprisings in Arab countries, 2011).

The references to oil in both types of statements featuring economic interests imply a realisation by the Indian government, which aligns with neorealist claims about the dangers of interrupting trade in 'strategic goods' for national security (Ripsman, 2005). However, the reference to fertilisers—vital imports for the 60 per cent of the Indian population working in agriculture (WTO, 2007)—as well as to India's '4.5 million workers in the region' (Devraj, 2011) suggests economic interest statements could just as easily be explained from a market-based perspective. Furthermore, while the absence of protectionist statements marks a strong difference from the Indian WTO results and speaks against a societal logic at first glance, the prominence of the liberalisation-friendly manufacturing and services sectors over the protectionist agriculture sector in India's trade with the Middle East (WTO, 2011) may in fact reinforce this logic.

The United States

Turning to the United States, clear differences are apparent. Although, as in the Indian corpus, statements featuring context variables dominated the US corpus, both power and economic interests appeared significantly less important to US officials than to their Indian counterparts. The emphasis was also different, whereas Indian statements featured power components and interests roughly equally, US statements overwhelmingly de-emphasised power and featured interests in only 4 of 258 statements. Thus, these differences suggest some element of uniqueness about Indian participation in the UNSC negotiations.

Turning to content, although both countries featured the same power components—*influence* and *sovereignty*—the content differed significantly between the two countries. Like Indian *influence* statements, some US statements focussed on the importance of including many states' voices in UNSC decisions. President Barack Obama, for example, stated 'American leadership is essential, but that does not mean acting alone—it means shaping the conditions for the international community to act together' (Obama, 2011b). Most, however, singled out the US's unique responsibility for world security. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton described the UN mission in Libya as a 'mission that the United States, of course, was going to be in the forefront of because of our unique capabilities' (Clinton & Gates, 2011). Similarly, US *sovereignty* statements appeared more focussed on the moral and practical implications of intervening in Libya's transformation than, like India, on the appropriateness of external intervention. As Clinton noted, the United States 'cannot and must not attempt to impose our will on the people of Libya' (Clinton, 2011c).

Furthermore, to an even greater degree than in the WTO case and in stark contrast to India, US statements de-emphasised the importance of power in the negotiations. De-emphasising *influence*, President Obama was specific about the limited nature of the US's role in the UN-led operations: the US 'would not put ground troops into Libya [...] would focus our unique capabilities on the front end of the operation and [...] would transfer responsibility to our allies and partners' (Obama, 2011a). Similarly, de-emphasising *autonomy*, Obama detailed the restrictions placed by Resolution 1973 on Gaddafi and underlined the importance of enforcing it lest 'the writ of the United Nations Security Council' appear 'little more than empty words, crippling that institution's future credibility to uphold global peace and security' (Obama, 2011a). Finally, de-emphasising *sovereignty*, many US statements appeared to take international intervention in Libyan domestic affairs for granted. Clinton, for example, called for a 'unified front of political and diplomatic pressure that makes clear to Gaddafi he must go' (Clinton, 2011c).

Turning to economic interests, differences are again apparent. Unlike Indian liberalisation statements, the single US liberalisation statement focussed not on the benefits of bilateral trade but on support for freer markets. Clinton stated, 'Americans understand the need for responsible investments in our security

for the future to make us safer, to keep markets open' (Clinton, 2011b). The two US sectoral interests statements underlined the benefits 'taxpayers' could expect from US involvement in the UN intervention—saving 'a great deal of money' (Clinton, 2011b)—and minimised the costs the defence industry expected from the UN's 'suspension of the very limited defence trade we have had with Libya' (Clinton, 2011a). In other words, as in the WTO case, US sectoral interest statements primarily focussed on the benefits, not the costs, of GG decisions. The decision to juxtapose attention to the interests of the US's strong defence sector lobby with voters' sensitivity to cost following the recent financial crisis underlines the logic of the market-based approach here.

Results

Regarding the 'power/market' portion of the case study, H1 found little empirical support. Not only did the components of power fail to dominate economic interests in the Indian corpus, but the corpus evidenced a foreign policy compatible with either market-based or power-based logic. This is surprising. After all, the joint abstention of the BRIC states from the vote on Resolution 1973 suggested the abstention was politically motivated and, consequently, meant to be a statement about their rising power and the need to grant them more responsibility within the UNSC. Regarding the 'emerging' portion, however, the evidence shows strong differences in both the distribution and content of statements featuring economic interests and the components of power. Furthermore, unlike the Indian corpus, the US corpus provided limited evidence linking it to either theoretical tradition. Consequently, it appears there is some evidence for the uniqueness of Indian behaviour in global security negotiations. The results are summarised in Figure 2.

Figure 2. UNSC Results

Source: Author's own.

Conclusion

This article has argued that the terms used to describe emerging states like India, Brazil and China have implications for how their motivations and behaviour in GG are understood. Pushing beyond these assumptions, this article has combined inductive and deductive approaches to systematically deconstruct these terms. Specifically, this article asks two questions, as yet under-explored in the literature. First, regarding the ‘emerging’ half of these terms, to what extent does the use of power and economic interests in emerging state rhetoric distinguish their participation in GG from that of traditional powers? Second, regarding the ‘power/market’ half, can the content of GG negotiations predict whether emerging states will prioritise power or economic interests in their GG rhetoric? Initial answers were provided by tracing the presence of the components of power and economic interests in the positions taken by Indian and US officials in WTO and UNSC negotiations.

Two clear differences were evident between emerging state and traditional power approaches to GG in the inductive portion of the article. First, emerging state and traditional power rhetoric was much more similar in the WTO than in the UNSC. In the WTO, both the United States and India favoured economic interests over context variables and the components of power in their statements. Additionally, for both states, a market-based explanatory logic was supported by the evidence. In contrast, in the UNSC case, India was much more likely than the United States to emphasise both economic interests and power, and there was a clear mismatch between the market-based and power-based logic(s) evident in the two corpora. This finding suggests the ‘emerging’ versus ‘traditional power’ distinction may be more relevant in global security governance than in global economic governance. This is plausible. After all, emerging states most recently came to the world’s notice because of remarkable economic growth rates and high-profile activities in global economic governance institutions. This distinction between global economic and security governance is also underlined by the second difference between India and the United States: US officials de-emphasised power in both GG negotiations, while India did so in neither. This distinction was especially pronounced in the UNSC case. This suggests that, even though the content of GG negotiations may not necessarily predict how important power is to emerging states within those negotiations, it may predict the relative importance of power for relations between emerging states and traditional powers within GG.

These findings have practical implications for the future of existing GG negotiations. First, the clear similarities between Indian and US participation in the WTO negotiations suggest common, domestic political pressures which, if acknowledged openly, may be able to enhance cooperation between emerging states and traditional powers in global economic governance. This was evident, for example, in the November 2014 bilateral deal between India and the United States, which enabled the implementation of the WTO’s Bali Agreement. Second, the avoidance of power in US rhetoric and the emphasis on power in Indian rhetoric reaffirms claims in the literature (Cooper, 2015; Vestergaard & Wade, 2015) that these types of states have contrasting agendas when it comes to GG reform. While some changes (e.g., the creation of the new Quad at the WTO) have been made to accommodate emerging state reform preferences in global economic governance, the apparatus of global security governance, particularly the UNSC, remains trapped in the 1940s. Furthermore, symbolic gestures, such as President Obama’s 2010 declaration of support for India’s aspiration to a permanent UNSC seat, appear insufficient to minimise the impact of power concerns on emerging state–traditional power participation in security negotiations.

Turning to the deductive portion of the article, the evidence in the WTO case study confirmed H2: economic interests dominated the components of power in global trade negotiations, which focussed on distributive questions. Furthermore, the market-based logic behind H2 was also confirmed empirically.

The UNSC case study, in contrast, failed to confirm H1: power was only slightly more prominent in Indian government rhetoric than economic interests in the security-focussed negotiations over Libya. In addition, the evidence provided some support for both approaches to emerging states. Here, the implications are primarily academic: deconstructing ‘emerging powers’ and ‘emerging markets’ shows that additional research systematically examining the relationship between power and economic interests seems the most fruitful way of understanding today’s emerging states, their participation in GG, and the implications of their emergence for today’s GG institutions.

Acknowledgements

I am grateful to the following people for their constructive criticism and helpful advice on earlier versions of this article: Yuan-Juhn Chiao, Eugénia da Conceição-Heldt, Stefan Schirm, Bernd Schlipphak, Jewellord Nem Singh, Mark Souva, the LSIP team at TU-Dresden, participants at the ISA Annual Convention (March 2014), and *India Quarterly*’s anonymous reviewers.

Notes

1. Some authors argue economic achievements facilitate power-based ones (Hurrell, 2006; Ikenberry, 2008); others argue the reverse (Landsberg, 2006); and yet others set these goals parallel (Nel & Stephen, 2010).
2. Clearly neither of these states can adequately represent the diversity of emerging states or traditional powers on their own. This article seeks only to provide a first look at relations between emerging states and traditional powers and at emerging state behaviour in GG. (Significantly) more research is necessary!
3. In emerging state democracies, such as India or Brazil, growing civil society participation in policymaking means powerful economic actors tend to be represented by interest groups. In contrast, in non-democratic emerging states, such as China, powerful domestic actors may be represented differently, for example, by competing factions within the Chinese Communist Party. Thus, the operationalisation used in this article is transferrable to other democratic emerging states as is but must be adapted to be applicable to non-democratic emerging states.
4. Though seemingly self-explanatory, the hypotheses are less so when considered from the opposing perspective. Power-based perspectives would expect emerging states to highlight power in negotiations with traditional powers regardless of issue area, since doing so should most efficiently promote emerging states’ own power aspirations. Market-based perspectives, in contrast, may see domestic economic interests at the heart of even security-based decisions, interpreting official security objectives as politically palatable covers for domestic actors’ interests.
5. Sovereignty and autonomy may sound similar at first. They differ in that sovereignty refers to who can make or change domestic policies. In contrast, autonomy focusses on who can restrict state behaviour or decisions.
6. A figure illustrating the distribution of the variables in each corpus appears at the end of each case study.
7. These statements fell outside the coding rules for ‘influence’ and consequently appear under ‘anti-power’ in Figures 1 and 2.

References

- Armijo, L.E., & Roberts, C. (2014). The emerging powers and global governance: Why the BRICS matter. In R. Looney (Ed.), *Handbook of emerging economies*. (pp. 503–524). New York: Routledge.
- Bagchi, I. (2011). India reduces mission in Libya. LexisNexis. Retrieved 9 February 2012.
- Baldwin, D.A. (1979). Power analysis and world politics: New trends versus old tendencies. *World Politics*, 31(2), 161–194. Retrieved from <http://www.nexis.com/docview/getDocForCuiReq?lni=52FG-CJF1-JB3N-T3BJ&csi=280434&oc=00240&perma=true>
- Barnett, M., & Duvall, R. (2005). Power in international politics. *International Organization*, 59(1), 39–75.
- Blustein, P. (2009). *Misadventures of the most favored nations: Clashing egos, inflated ambitions, and the great shambles of the world trade system*. New York: PublicAffairs.

- Bush, G.W. (2008a). The President's news conference with Chancellor Angela Merkel of Germany in Meseberg, Germany. Retrieved 13 February 2014 from <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=77483>
- . (2008b). The President's news conference with European Union leaders in Kranj. Retrieved 13 February 2014 from <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=77482>
- . (2008c). The President's radio address. Retrieved 13 February from <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=77536>
- Clinton, H.R. (2011a). Holding the Qadhafi government accountable. Retrieved 8 February 2014 from <http://www.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2011/02/157187.htm>
- . (2011b). Opening remarks before the Senate foreign relations committee. Retrieved 8 February from
- . (2011c). Remarks at the International Conference on Libya. Retrieved 8 February 2014 from <http://www.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2011/03/159283.htm>
- Clinton, H.R., & Gates, R. (2011). *Interview with Bob Schieffer of CBS's Face the Nation*. Washington, DC. Retrieved 8 February 2014 from <http://www.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2011/03/159210.htm>
- Cooper, A.F. (2015). 'The G20 and rising powers: An innovative but awkward form of multilateralism', in D. Lesage & T. Van de Graaf (Eds), *Rising powers and multilateral institutions* (pp. 280–294). Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Devraj, R. (2011, March 9). India: Allies unite against no-fly zone for Libya, *Inter press Service*. Retrieved 26 January 2012 from www.lexisnexis.com
- DoC (2008a). *Commerce Minister's statement on the Doha Round negotiations*. Retrieved 17 May 2009 from http://commerce.nic.in/PressRelease/pressrelease_detail.asp?id=2214
- . (2008b). *India-US emphasize on the need to conclude Doha Round negotiations this year*. Retrieved 12 June 2014 from http://commerce.nic.in/PressRelease/pressrelease_detail.asp?id=2264
- . (2008c). *Kamal Nath's statement on the revised agriculture and NAMA Texts of 19 May 2008*. Retrieved 16 February 2014 from http://commerce.nic.in/pressrelease/pressrelease_detail.asp?id=2267
- . (2008d). *Kamal Nath calls for fair deal for developing countries in the WTO negotiations*. Retrieved 15 May 2009 from http://commerce.nic.in/PressRelease/pressrelease_detail.asp?id=2289
- . (2008e). *Statement of Shri Kamal Nath, Minister of Commerce & Industry, Govt Of India at the TNC meeting in Geneva on 23rd July, 2008*. Retrieved 9 April 2012 from http://commerce.nic.in/PressRelease/pressrelease_detail.asp?id=2290
- Doha Round talks sways, shows signs of breakdown (2008). LexisNexis. Retrieved 15 May 2009 from www.lexisnexis.com
- Drezner, D.W. (2007). The new new world order. *Foreign Affairs*, 86(2), 34–46.
- The Economist*. (2015a). High Visibility. *The Economist*, p. 14.
- Foot, R. (2006). Chinese strategies in a US-hegemonic global order: Accommodating and hedging. *International Affairs*, 82(1), 77–94.
- Gilboy, G.J., & Heginbotham, E. (2013). Double trouble: A realist view of Chinese and Indian power. *The Washington Quarterly*, 36(3), 125–142.
- Gratius, S. (2008). The international arena and emerging powers: Stabilising or destabilising forces? *FRIDE Comment Paper*.
- Hirst, M. (2008). Brazil-India relations: A reciprocal learning process. *South Asian Survey*, 15(1), 143–164.
- Huotari, M., & Hanemann, T. (2014). Emerging powers and change in the global financial order. *Global Policy*. doi: 10.1111/1758-5899.12133
- Hurrell, A. (2006). Hegemony, liberalism and global order: What space for would-be great powers? *International Affairs*, 82(1), 1–19.
- Ikenberry, G.J. (2008). The rise of China and the future of the West. *Foreign Affairs*, 87(1), 23–37.
- India opposes coalition strikes in Libya (2011, March 22). *IBNS*. Retrieved 26 January 2012 from www.lexisnexis.com
- India, four others abstain from UN's Libya no-fly zone resolution (2011). LexisNexis. Retrieved 30 January 2012 from www.nexis.com

- Kahler, M. (2013). Rising powers and global governance: Negotiating change in a resilient status quo. *International Affairs*, 89(3), 711–729.
- Kale, S.S. (2009). Inside out: India's global reorientation. *India Review*, 8(1), 43–62.
- Kinett, E. (2008). India welcomes Nath back from WTO with open arms. LexisNexis. Retrieved 15 May 2009 from <http://www.lexisnexis.com>
- Krishna, S.M. (2011). EAM's remarks at the release of India's national security annual review 2010 New Delhi: Indian Ministry of External Affairs. Retrieved 30 January 2012 from <http://www.lexisnexis.com>
- Landsberg, C. (2006). IBSA's political origins, significance and challenges. *Synopsis*, 8(2), 4–7.
- Lesage, D., & Van de Graaf, T. (2015). 'Analytical framework and findings', in D. Lesage & T. Van de Graaf (Eds), *Rising powers and multilateral institutions* (pp. 3–18). Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Libya protests: Defiant Gaddafi refuses to quit (2011, February 22). *BBC News*. Retrieved 10 February 2012 from <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-12544624>
- Lilja, J. (2012). Domestic-level factors and negotiation (in)flexibility in the WTO. *International Negotiation*, 17(1), 115–138.
- Mahrenbach, L.C. (2013). *The Trade Policy of Emerging Powers: Strategic Choices of Brazil and India*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Mansfield, E.D. (2014). Rising powers in the global economy: Issues and questions. *International Studies Review*, 16(3), 437–442.
- MEA (2008). *G-5 political declaration*. Retrieved 16 February 2014 from <http://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/5272/G5+Political+Declaration>
- . (2011). *UNSC resolution on Libya-India's explanation of vote*. Retrieved 30 January 2012 from <http://mea.gov.in/press-releases.htm?dtl/639/UNSC+resolution+on+Libya++Indias+Explanation+of+Vote>
- The Economist*. (2015, May 23). Modi's Many Problems (2015, May 23). *The Economist*, pp. 3–5.
- Moravcsik, A. (1997). Taking preferences seriously: A liberal theory of international politics. *International Organizations*, 51(4), 513–553.
- Narlikar, A. (2006). Peculiar chauvinism or strategic calculation? Explaining the negotiating strategy of a rising India. *International Affairs*, 82(1), 59–76.
- Nel, P., & Stephen, M. (2010). 'The foreign economic policies of regional powers in the developing world', in D. Flesher (Ed.), *Regional leadership in the global system: Ideas, interests and strategies of regional powers* (pp. 71–92). Surrey, England: Ashgate.
- Obama, B. (2011a). *Remarks by the President in address to the nation on Libya*. Retrieved 8 February 2014 from <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/03/28/remarks-president-address-nation-libya>
- . (2011b). *Remarks by the President on the situation in Libya*. Retrieved 8 February 2014 from <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/03/18/remarks-president-situation-libya>
- Pardesi, M.S. (2007). Understanding the rise of India. *India Review*, 6(3), 209–231.
- Q.822 Recent uprisings in Arab countries*. (2011). Retrieved from <http://meaindia.nic.in/mystart.php?id=220117334> (Published online on 23 August 2007).
- Ripsman, N.M. (2005). 'False dichotomies: Why economics is high politics', in P. Dombrowski (Ed.), *Guns and butter: The political economy of international security* (pp. 15–31). Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
- Schaffer, T.C. (2010). India: Driving the global superhighway. *Brown Journal of World Affairs*, 16(2), 219–226.
- Schirm, S.A. (2009). Ideas and interests in global financial governance: Comparing German and US preference formation. *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, 22(3), 501–521.
- . (2008a). *Ambassador Susan C. Schwab, USTR WITA Dinner and Award Ceremony*. Retrieved 13 February 2014 from http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/speeches/2008/asset_upload_file26_15029.pdf
- Schwab, S.C. (2008b). *Ambassador Susan C. Schwab, USTR Doha Media Roundtable*. Retrieved 13 February 2014 from http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/speeches/2008/asset_upload_file887_15028.pdf
- . (2008c). *Press briefing*. Retrieved 13 February 2014 from http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/speeches/2008/asset_upload_file786_15046.pdf
- . (2008d). *Press briefing with U.S. trade representative Susan Schwab*. Retrieved 13 February 2014 from http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/speeches/2008/asset_upload_file156_15032.pdf

- Schwab, S.C. (2008e). *Statement of Ambassador Susan C. Schwab, US trade representative*. Retrieved 13 February 2014 from http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/pdfs/press_release/2008/asset_upload_file555_15033.pdf
- Sharma, B. (2011). UNSC slaps 'biting' sanctions on Libya. Retrieved 9 February 2012 from www.lexisnexis.com
- Singh, Y. (2008, July 19). India says it will not compromise even if WTO talks collapse, *The Press Trust of India*. Retrieved from www.lexisnexis.com
- Stephen, M.D. (2012). Rising regional powers and international institutions. The foreign policy orientations of India, Brazil and South Africa. *Global Society*, 26(3), 289–309.
- UN (2011a). *UN envoy expected in Libya next week to discuss humanitarian, political issues*. Retrieved from <http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=37744&Cr=libya&Cr1=&Kw1=Libya&Kw2=&Kw3=>
- . (2011b). *UN human rights council to hold special session on Libya*. Retrieved 10 February 2012 from <http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=37596&Cr=Libya&Cr1=&Kw1=Libya&Kw2=&Kw3=>
- UNSC (2011a). *Resolution 1970 (2011)*. New York City: United Nations.
- . (2011b). *Resolution 1973 (2011)*. New York City: United Nations.
- Vestergaard, J., & Wade, R.H. (2015). 'Protecting power: How Western states retain their dominant voice in the World Bank's governance', in D. Lesage & T. Van de Graaf (Eds), *Rising powers and multilateral institutions* (pp. 175–196). Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Vigevani, T., & Cepaluni, G. (2007). Lula's foreign policy and the quest for autonomy through diversification. *Third World Quarterly*, 28(7), 1309–1326.
- Waltz, K.N. (1979). *Theory of international politics*. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.
- We may walk out, if our concerns not addressed (2008, July 16). *Hindustan Times*. Retrieved from www.lexisnexis.com
- WTO (2007). Trade policy review report by the Secretariat-India: Revision, July 24, WT/TPR/S/182/Rev.1.
- . (2011). Trade policy review report by the Secretariat - India, WT/TPR/S/249/Rev.1.
- WTO chief Lamy visiting India to try to revive trade talks (2008, August 11). *Indo-Asian News Service*. Retrieved 15 May 2009 from www.lexisnexis.com
- Yadav, V. (2008). Business lobbies and policymaking in developing countries: The contrasting cases of India and China. *Journal of Public Affairs*, 8(1–2), 67–82.